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COMMENTS
DID GEBSER CAUSE THE METASTASIZATION OF THE
SEXUAL HARASSMENT EPIDEMIC IN EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS? A CRITICAL REVIEW OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE IX TEN YEARS LATER
I. INTRODUCTION
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 19721 ("Title IX") has
two very different faces. The media, on one hand, has cast its
spotlight on Title IX's imprint on equal participation among men
and women in college athletics. This impact has been so tremen-
dous that the Women's National Basketball Association attrib-
utes its creation, and the 1999 World Cup champion United
States Women's soccer team ascribes its success, to Title IX.2
Throughout the 1990s, headlines routinely focused on female stu-
dent athletes armed with Title IX and lobbying their universities
to expand women's sports teams.3 Subsequently, when financially
strapped universities began cutting some non-self-sustaining
men's teams, the media shifted focus to the backlash from male
student athletes.4 Media attention reached its pinnacle in 2002
when, amidst great publicity, Secretary of Education Rod Paige
created the Commission of Opportunity in Athletics to study
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000).
2. See David S. Cohen, Limiting Gebser: Institutional Liability for Non-Harassment
Sex Discrimination Under Title IX, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 311, 311-12 (2004).
3. See, e.g., Associated Press, Female Athletes Win Title IX Suit vs. Brown, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 30, 1995, at 4D; Bob Monahan, Women Get Boost at UMass Proposal
Calls to Add Crew, Water Polo Teams, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 8, 1993, at 98; Gary Rein-
muth, Illinois Joins Ranks of Women's Soccer, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 7, 1997, at 3.
4. See, e.g., Lori Riley, Not in the Same Boat in Wake of Title IX, UConn Women Have
Advantage Over Men's Crew, HARTFORD COURANT, May 19, 1998, at Cl; Jeffrey Shelman,
UC to Eliminate Three Men's Sports, CIN. POST, May 6, 1998, at 1A.
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methods for strengthening Title IX enforcement and expanding
athletic opportunities for college students.5
Meanwhile, as college athletics dominated the media's Title IX
attention, sexual harassment commanded that of the courts. The
Supreme Court of the United States has yet to address substan-
tively athletic equality, relying instead on lower courts to advance
this aspect of Title IX jurisprudence. In the area of sexual har-
assment, however, the Court has spoken three times in the last
decade and hundreds of lower court decisions have painted this
part of the Title IX landscape. These cases have generally con-
cerned teacher-on-student harassment, but have also included
peer-to-peer harassment and even employee-employer harass-
ment.
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District was the first
Supreme Court case to address a Title IX action alleging teacher-
on-student sexual harassment.6 The Court articulated a standard
of liability for educational institutions faced with allegations of
sexual harassment by a teacher.7 It held that liability under Title
IX would not attach to an educational institution unless an ap-
propriate person, defined as an official of the institution with au-
thority to take corrective action, has actual knowledge of the of-
fensive conduct and fails to respond adequately.' A second
Supreme Court opinion handed down just a year later reiterated
the Gebser standard for peer-to-peer sexual harassment and
added that the educational institution must exercise a threshold
degree of control over the harasser and the environment in which
the harassment occurs.9 Then, in 2005, the Supreme Court spoke
to retaliation by an educational institution against an individual
who had alleged a Title IX violation.1
Prior to the actual knowledge standard crafted by the Court in
Gebser, lower courts had applied as many as seven different insti-
tutional standards of liability. These included strict liability,
agency principles or negligence, agency principles alone, negli-
5. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., Secretary's Commission on Opportunity in Athletics,
http://www.ed.gov/aboutfbdscomm/list/athletics/index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
6. See 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
7. See id. at 290.
8. Id.
9. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645 (1999).
10. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005).
[Vol. 42:12571258
REVIEW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
gence, intentional discrimination, actual knowledge, and whether
a reasonable avenue of complaint was made available.11 Strict li-
ability is the lowest standard of institutional liability any court
has ever applied, while a "reasonable avenue of complaint" is the
highest. Under a strict liability standard, once the plaintiff makes
the necessary showing that sexual harassment occurred between
a coach or teacher and a student, or between two students, liabil-
ity is automatically imputed to the educational institution. 12 A
"reasonable avenue of complaint" standard, on the other hand,
shields educational institutions from liability so long as the insti-
tution merely provides a reasonable means for victims of sexual
harassment to complain and notify the proper officials.' 3 Leading
up to the Gebser decision, most commentators argued for the
adoption of a standard based on agency principles.14
This comment will evaluate the criticism of Gebser in two novel
ways, now that ten years have passed since the Supreme Court
issued the decision. Part II will provide pertinent background in-
formation on Title IX. Part III will identify the problem sexual
harassment in educational institutions poses for this country's
youth. Part IV will discuss the development of Title IX sexual
harassment jurisprudence, including the Gebser decision. Part V
will address the foundation of the criticism fired at Gebser's adop-
tion of an actual notice and deliberate indifference standard of in-
stitutional liability from two fresh perspectives. First, the policy
behind agency principals will be contrasted with the realities of
public school education. Second, an empirical test will provide
statistics to critically evaluate the claims of commentators. Part
VI will comment on the ten-year span of cases since Gebser and
offer a compromise between the solution proffered by commenta-
tors and the actual decision in Gebser.
11. See Dawn A. Ellison, Sexual Harassment in Education: A Review of Standards for
Institutional Liability Under Title IX, 75 N.C. L. REV. 2049, 2095-118 (1997).
12. See id. at 2095-96 (citing Bolon v. Rolla Pub. Sch., 917 F. Supp. 1423, 1427-28
(E.D. Mo. 1996)).
13. See id. at 2116-18 (discussing Pallett v. Palma, 914 F. Supp. 1018 (S.D.N.Y.
1996)).
14. See, e.g., Neera Rellan Stacy, Seeking a Superior Institutional Liability Standard
Under Title IX for Teacher-Student Sexual Harassment, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1338, 1384
(1996).
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II. THE ROOTS OF TITLE IX
Title IX is the only federal avenue through which families of
student-victims of sexual harassment may recover against educa-
tional institutions.15 It provides that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination un-
der any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."'16 Title IX was part of the Educational Amendments
of 1972 and was aimed at combating discrimination based on sex
in educational institutions receiving federal funding. 17 Its frame-
work was drawn from the Civil Rights legislation of the previous
decade."8 While it is not necessary to provide an exhaustive his-
tory because other commentators have done so, a short historical
summary of Title IX will develop the context for the remaining
sections.
In 1970, Representative Edith Green (D-Ore.), Chairwoman of
the Special Subcommittee on Education of the House of Repre-
sentatives, directed a hearing that revealed the prevalence of
sexual discrimination against female students in primary, secon-
dary, and post-secondary schools.19 Because Title IX was initially
introduced as a floor amendment,2" there is little legislative his-
tory, such as hearings or reports, to guide the courts in interpret-
15. See Meghan E. Cherner-Ranft, The Empty Promise of Title IX: Why Girls Need
Courts to Reconsider Liability Standards and Preemption in School Sexual Harassment
Cases, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1891, 1893 (2003).
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
17. See Kimberly A. Mango, Students Versus Professors: Combating Sexual Harass-
ment Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 23 CONN. L. REV. 355, 379
(1991).
18. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 included several provisions making discrimination
unlawful. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). The language of Title IX closely resembles
the language of Title VI, which was part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It reads, "[n]o per-
son in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
19. See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on H.R. 16098 Before the Spec. Sub-
comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong. 14 (1970) (statement of Myra Ruth Harmon,
President, National, Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc.); see
also U.S. Dep't of Educ., Title IX: A Sea Change in Gender Equity in Education in TITLE
IX: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS (2007), http://www.ed.gov/pubs/TitleDUpart3.html.
20. See Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 373 (1972); Debora A. Hoehne, Note, As-
sessing the Compatibility of Title IX and § 1983: A Post-Abrams Framework for Preemp-
tion, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 3194 (2006).
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ing the scope of the amendment. 21 This void may explain the de-
lay by courts in developing Title IX jurisprudence-its application
to college athletic departments, whether sexual harassment falls
within its scope, and what standard of liability to apply to educa-
tional institutions. In fact, courts have consistently cited this lack
of legislative history as introducing uncertainty into efforts to in-
terpret Title IX's scope.22 For example, in 1984, the Supreme
Court in Grove City College v. Bell limited Title IX's scope to spe-
cific programs or activities that receive financial assistance
within an educational institution.2" The Court's interpretation
implied that Title IX could apply to some programs within an
educational institution but not to others, such as self-sustaining
athletic programs.24 This interpretation was superseded by stat-
ute, however, when Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration
Act in 1988, which made Title IX applicable to all programs and
activities within an educational institution receiving federal aid
regardless of how the institution dispersed the aid.25 Congress
thus felt that the Court in Grove City misinterpreted the scope of
the Amendment.
The United States Department of Education's ("DOE") Office
for Civil Rights ("OCR") is currently responsible for enforcing the
regulations promulgated under Title IX.26 Specifically, the OCR
21. See Note, Sex Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics: Putting Some Muscle
on Title IX, 88 YALE L.J. 1254, 1255 (1979). Floor amendments are introduced by indi-
viduals during consideration of a bill or other measure. U.S. Senate, Floor Amendment,
http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary-tern/floor-amendment.htm (last visited Apr. 2,
2008).
22. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 586 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that Title IX's legislative history failed to clar-
ify its intended application), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000)); 118 CONG. REC.
5808 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
23. Grove City, 465 U.S. at 573-75.
24. See id. at 573-74.
25. See Civil Rights Restoration Act § b.
26. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, About OCR, http://www.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/aboutocr.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2008). Originally, the agency re-
sponsible for administering Title IX and promulgating regulations pursuant thereto was
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW'). It was responsible for issuing
the 1975 regulations, which pertained to six general matters and barred sex discrimina-
tion in any academic, extracurricular, research, occupational training, or other educational
program (preschool to postgraduate) operated by an organization receiving or benefiting
from federal aid, see Non Discrimination on the Basis of Education Programs and Activi-
ties Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (June
4, 1975) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 86), as well as the 1979 interpretation, which clarified and
interpreted the 1975 regulations, see Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Pol-
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has the authority to terminate an educational institution's fund-
ing if an OCR investigation reveals a Title IX violation.2 7 OCR is-
sued a memorandum in 1981 stating that sexual harassment con-
stituted sex discrimination within the meaning of Title IX. 2' The
memorandum defined sexual harassment as consisting of "verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature, imposed on the basis of
sex, by an employee or agent of a recipient, that denies, limits,
provides different, or conditions the provision of aid, benefits, ser-
vices or treatment protected under [T]itle IX."29 Additionally, cov-
ered institutions must have a grievance procedure in place that
provides for the expeditious and equitable resolution of sexual
harassment complaints.3" Educational institutions are also pro-
hibited from hiring an employee with a history of discriminatory
behavior of which the institutions knew or should have known.31
An educational institution can thus be liable under Title IX di-
rectly or vicariously. If the institution fails to follow the regula-
tory guidelines of Title IX, it can be held in direct violation. This
would occur, for example, if a university failed to provide a griev-
ance procedure for sexual harassment complaints, or if the uni-
versity knowingly hired an instructor with a criminal record of
sexual harassment. Alternatively, the same university could be
held vicariously liable under Title IX if one of its teachers com-
mitted sexual harassment when the university had actual knowl-
edge of the conduct and failed to act reasonably. The Title IX
regulations did not provide, however, a standard of institutional
liability.
icy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 86). Subse-
quently, HEW was divided into the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS")
and the DOE. See Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat.
66 (1979) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3510 (2000)).
27. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000).
28. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1015 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
OCR Policy Memorandum from Antonio J. Califa, Dir. of Litig., Enforcement, and Policy
Ser., to Regional Civil Rights Dir. (Aug. 31, 1981) (on file with author)).
29. Id. (emphasis omitted).
30. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (2007).
31. See, e.g., Mueller v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist., 678 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997).
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III. THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT EPIDEMIC
While the OCR has the power to terminate federal funding for
an institution that it finds has violated Title IX, student-victims
of sexual harassment have another avenue for addressing Title IX
violations. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Supreme
Court held that a student-victim of sexual harassment could sue
an educational institution for a violation of Title IX.32 The Court
determined that, although the statute did not explicitly provide a
private right of action, one could be inferred from the congres-
sional intent behind the statute.33 Of course, with little guidance
from legislative history, it remains a mystery how the Court was
able to perceive Congress's intent to provide a private right of ac-
tion. Notwithstanding, the Court's decision in Cannon bears
much of the responsibility for the effort to eradicate sexual har-
assment from this country's educational institutions under the
guise of Title IX.34
The Supreme Court's decision in Gebser has been criticized,
however, as stymieing this effort.35 Commentators have shown
particular concern that the bar has been set too high. They claim
that the current standard for liability sharply reduces the odds
that courts will hear sexual harassment claims arising in educa-
tional institutions.36 With more and more information surfacing
about the prevalence of sexual harassment within our nation's
schools, if true, the effect of the Gebser decision should prove
troubling.
A recent investigation by the Associated Press exemplifies the
sexual harassment epidemic facing our nation's schools. 37 It un-
covered more than 2500 cases over five years of educators being
punished for sexual-harassment related conduct. 3' The most dis-
turbing fact uncovered by the investigation is not the sheer
32. 441 U.S. 677, 680, 688-89 (1979).
33. Id. at 717.
34. See Jill S. Vogel, Between a (Schoolhouse) Rock and a Hard Place: Title IX Peer
Harassment Liability After Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 37 HOUS. L. REV.
1525, 1535 (2000) (arguing that Cannon laid the foundation for Title IX sexual harass-
ment doctrine).
35. See infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Cherner-Ranft, supra note 15, at 1910.
37. Associated Press, Sexual Misconduct Plagues U.S. Schools, Oct. 20, 2007, http://
www.msnbc.msn.comid/21392345/from/ET/ [hereinafter Misconduct].
38. Id.
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prevalence of sexual harassment in schools, but that in more
cases than not, it is not the schools ferreting out the illicit con-
duct, but rather the parents of the victims. For example, in the
case of Gary C. Lindsey, a teacher from Oelwein, Iowa, it was not
a school principal or government agency that terminated his ca-
reer.39 Rather, more than forty years after committing his first
known act of sexual harassment-fondling a fifth-grade girl dur-
ing recess-the persistent parents of one victim finally succeeded
in having his license revoked.4 °
No one would argue that Congress has ignored the general
problem of crimes against children. The trend over the last sev-
eral decades signals a definite increase in protective legislation
for victims of sex crimes, with many laws bearing the names of
the young victims.41 If the Gebser standard has indeed made it
more difficult for victims to bring Title IX claims for sexual har-
assment, then a reasonable person could conclude that the ab-
sence of congressional response indicates a shift in policy. More-
over, one might view the new standard as contradicting the
Court's previous announcement that Title IX should be given "'a
sweep as broad as its language."'42 A closer look, however, may
reveal the distinction between passing sex-crime legislation and
broad enactments affecting teachers and educational institutions.
Sex crimes tend to punish individuals. In states like Texas, for
example, convicted sex offenders face twenty-five-year minimum
sentences, and child rapists may be sentenced to death.43 Also, a
series of laws passed in the mid-1990s led to federally mandated
sex offender registries. In 1994, the Jacob Wetterling Act re-
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
248, § 116, 120 Stat. 587, 595 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16916) (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring
certain sex offenders to update their whereabouts every three months); Jacob Wetterling
Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, § 170101(a), 108 Stat. 2038, 2038 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a) (2000))
(mandating that each state create a specific program to register sex offenders); Student
Right-To-Know and Campus Security Act, Pub L. No. 101-542, § 204, 140 Stat. 2381,
2385-87 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2000)) (requiring institutions
of higher education to collect and make public campus crime statistics, including sex of-
fenses).
42. See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (quoting United States
v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)).
43. Diane Jennings & Darlean Spangenberger, Crackdown on Sex Offenders, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 21, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcon
tentdws/news/politics/local/stories/DN-sexoffend-2 ltex.ART.State.Edition2.42880f4. html.
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quired all states to pass legislation creating sex offender regis-
tries.44 In 1996, based on a set of New Jersey laws called Megan's
Laws, Congress passed a law requiring all states to publish per-
sonal information of known sex offenders. 5 Federal legislation
passed just last year further enhanced uniformity in these regis-
tries by creating three tiers of sex offenders.46 The individual sex-
crime laws are ubiquitous and highly punitive.
Sex crime laws that touch an entire profession are much less
prevalent. Teachers that commit sex crimes are certainly subject
to conviction under sex crime laws just like any other sex crimi-
nal. Nonetheless, laws such as Title IX that affect education as a
field carry different policy implications. In the 1999-2000 school
year, fifty eight percent of all schools in the country reported dif-
ficulty in finding teachers in one or more fields.47 While teachers
who have not and do not intend to commit sexual harassment
should not fear new legislation or court decisions strengthening
Title IX enforcement, increased scrutiny and negative publicity
on the teaching profession could hinder efforts to recruit new
teachers. Therefore, the Gebser standard may not mark a shift in
policy at all.
Legislators and courts may act tentatively toward uncovering
sexual harassment for fear of the negative effects on the teaching
profession. It might also be reasonable to believe that schools are
similarly tentative toward uncovering sexual harassment. Per-
haps this explains why Donald M. Landrum, a high school
teacher from Polk County, North Carolina, experienced no resis-
tance when he covered the window on his office door with paper
after the school had specially installed the window upon discover-
ing that Landrum was having meetings with female students be-
hind closed doors.4 Police later uncovered pornography and con-
doms and alleged he was close to having sexual relations with one
44. See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Reg-
istration Act § 170101(a).
45. See Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, § 2, 110 Stat. 1345, 1345 (1996) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e) (2000)).
46. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act.
47. RICHARD M. INGERSOLL, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF TEACHING AND POLICY AND
THE CONSORTIUM FOR POLICY RESEARCH IN EDUCATION, IS THERE REALLY A TEACHER
SHORTAGE? 6 (2003), available at http://depts.washington.edu/ctpmail/PDFs/Shortage-RI-
09-2003.pdf.
48. See Misconduct, supra note 37.
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of his female students. 9 School apathy toward uncovering sexual
harassment might also explain why Rebecca A. Boicelli, a former
teacher in Redwood City, California, conceived a child with one of
her sixteen-year-old students and was hired shortly thereafter by
a school in a neighboring district."0 Board members explained the
situation as a failure to tell the police about the investigation.5'
School boards and teachers' unions have demonstrated a pro-
pensity to combat sexual harassment in schools on their own ac-
cord, but their methods are suspect. Despite the case of Rebecca
A. Boicelli, school systems have carved inroads into the sexual
harassment epidemic through the sharing of information. In
1987, the National Association of State Directors of Teacher Edu-
cation and Certification (the "Certification Association") created a
list of teachers who have had licensing issues, including those re-
sulting from behavioral problems.52 The list contains more than
37,000 teachers53 and is available to school administrators. 54
Nonetheless, the list has its flaws.55 First, it only provides names,
birthdates, and social security numbers; no information is pro-
vided concerning the details of the misconduct or the cause of the
licensing issue. 56 It is up to a hiring school or state agency to con-
duct an investigation to uncover the specifics of any wrongdo-
ing.5 7 Second, the list is unavailable to the public.5" Third, the list
is believed not to include teachers who were disciplined prior to
1984.' 9 Therefore, it may be difficult for a student-victim of sex-
ual harassment to utilize the list to satisfy the Gebser standard
that an educational institution knew of prior alleged wrongdoing
by a teacher and should have known about the alleged unlawful
conduct.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Jane Elizabeth Zemel, Dirty Secrets: Flawed System Aids Bad Teachers, POST-
GAZETTE NEWS (Pittsburgh, Pa.), Nov. 1, 1999, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/
regionstate/1999110labusel.asp.
53. Robert Tanner, Patchwork Laws, Inattention Have Allowed Teacher Sexual Mis-
conduct to Flourish, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD (Lawrence, Kan.), Oct. 23, 2007, http://www2.
ljworld.com/news/ 2007/oct/23/patchwork-laws inattention-allow teacher sexual_mi.
54. See Zemel, supra note 52.
55. Tanner, supra note 53.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Zemel, supra note 52.
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Notwithstanding piecemeal efforts like the Certification Asso-
ciation's list, school boards and teachers' unions have resisted leg-
islative initiatives to strengthen efforts at rooting out sexual har-
assment in schools.6 ° Most of this resistance stems from privacy
concerns.61 An organized group with a unified voice, such as a
school board or teachers' union, is more likely to resist success-
fully laws affecting their constituents than is an individual af-
fected by sex offender registration or sex crime laws. For exam-
ple, after Chad Maughan, a teacher in Washington State caught
twice viewing pornography on school computers, was convicted of
raping a fourteen-year-old student on school grounds, the state
legislature passed a law clarifying the definition of sexual mis-
conduct and requiring school districts to share information.62
Leading up to the law's passage, Washington State Senator Don
Benton (R-17th) commented, "We had tremendous resistance
from the teachers [sic] union when it came to personnel files."63
Also, Representative Adam Putnam (R-Fla.) proposed legislation
to create a national public registry of educators convicted of sex-
ual offenses along with a national hotline for reports of sexual
abuse in schools.64 As of March 2008, the bill has not yet received
65
a hearing.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT JURISPRUDENCE
As a result of sparse legislative history and the absence of any
pertinent regulations, the evolution of sexual harassment law
under Title IX proceeded slowly, and many courts turned to Title
VII, which covers sexual harassment in the workplace, 66 and Title
VI, which proscribes racial discrimination in schools. 67 Although
the support seems logical because Title IX concerns sexual har-
assment in schools, some courts have disagreed on the role Title
VI and Title VII should play in fashioning Title IX jurispru-
60. See Misconduct, supra note 37.
61. School officials often fear public embarrassment so they strive to avoid publicity of
allegations of sexual misconduct by dismissing their teachers quietly. Id. The state of
Maine even has a law that keeps offending teachers' cases confidential. Id.
62. See Tanner, supra note 53.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
67. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2000d-7 (2000).
2008] 1267
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dence.68 The extent of influence of Title VI and Title VII case law
on Title IX claims was confused by the Supreme Court's decision
in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, which for the first
time permitted damages for intentional discrimination under Ti-
tle IX.69 There, the Court relied on a Title VII case, Meritor Sav-
ings Bank v. Vinson, in stating "'when a supervisor sexually har-
asses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that
supervisor discriminate[s] on the basis of sex,"' and that "same
rule should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a
student."7 °
Although the Court in Franklin did not explicitly adopt the
standard of employer liability of Title VII, the reference to Meri-
tor Savings Bank led lower courts to assume it did.7' Under Title
VII, two different standards of employer liability may apply de-
pending on the type of sexual harassment involved. The first type
of sexual harassment claim involves the grant of a promise by a
supervisor of some economic or job benefit in exchange for per-
formance of a sexual act by a subordinate.72 This quid pro quo
harassment results in direct liability for the employer when
courts have applied agency principles in adjudicating these Title
VII claims.73 In other words, an employer cannot shield itself
from Title VII liability for quid pro quo sexual harassment by one
of its employees simply by claiming that it lacked knowledge of
the unlawful conduct.
68. Compare Hastings v. Hancock, 842 F. Supp. 1315, 1318 (D. Kan. 1993) (applying
the agency principles of Title VII to a claim under Title IX), with Leija v. Canutillo Indep.
Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 947, 950 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (refusing to apply Title VII principles to
a Title IX case and instead relying on Title VI principles), rev'd on other grounds, 101 F.3d
393 (5th Cir. 1996).
69. See 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992).
70. Id. at 75 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
71. See Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir. 1993); Lipsett
v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 896-97 (1st Cir. 1988); Kadiki v. Va. Commonwealth Univ.,
892 F. Supp. 746, 749-50 (E.D. Va. 1995) ("[Mlany lower courts have explicitly turned to
Title VII and the broad body of related jurisprudence for guidance in Title IX cases, at
least in the employment discrimination context." (citing Preston v. Virginia, 31 F.3d 203,
207 (4th Cir. 1994))).
72. See Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(defining quid pro quo sexual harassment); Ellison, supra note 11 at 2055.
73. See Heather S. Murr, The Continuing Expansive Pressure To Hold Employers
Strictly Liable for Supervisory Sexual Extortion: An Alternative Approach Based on Rea-
sonableness, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 533-34 (2006).
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The second type of sexual harassment under Title VII is the
creation of a hostile environment through harassing conduct.7 4
Courts have stated that when harassing conduct "'has the pur-
pose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offen-
sive working environment,"' a hostile environment is created in
violation of Title VII. 75 The appropriate standard of liability in
such a case is whether the employer had actual or constructive
knowledge of the unlawful conduct.76 If the employer lacked
knowledge, no liability will attach. Nonetheless, even if the em-
ployer has actual or constructive knowledge, if the employer
takes "prompt [and] reasonable" action to remedy the situation,
no liability will attach.77 Whether an action is 'prompt and rea-
sonable' is a question of fact.""
A. Institutional Standards of Liability Leading Up to Gebser
While the knowledge standard was applied by the majority of
courts hearing sexual harassment claims under Title IX, numer-
ous other standards emerged in the wake of the Court's silence in
Franklin. These standards ranged from strict liability, where an
educational institution would be liable for any proven act of sex-
ual harassment, to a standard where an employer could shield it-
self from liability by merely providing a reasonable avenue for the
victim to complain. Although the Supreme Court has now re-
sponded to the confusion and cleared the muddied waters by
adopting a standard of institutional liability, a review of the myr-
iad of other standards applied during the late 1980s and 1990s
leading up to Gebser will provide context for later discussion. The
most emphasis will be given to the three standards discussed in
Gebser, two of which the Court considered and dismissed.
74. See id. at 533.
75. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1985)).
76. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 768-69 (1998) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citing Dennis v. County of Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 153 (4th Cir. 1995); Davis v.
Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988)).
77. Lewis v. Zilog, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 931, 957 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (citing Steele v. Off-
shore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989)).
78. Stacy, supra note 14, at 1350.
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1. Negligence: The "Should Have Known" Standard
Pre-Gebser, several courts borrowed from Title VII negligence
as a standard of liability for Title IX claims of sexual harassment.
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit applied a negligence standard to a case concerning an al-
legation of hostile environment sexual harassment brought under
Title IX. 79 In Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, the court held
that the university could not be liable unless it had actual knowl-
edge, or with the exercise of reasonable care should have known
of the unlawful conduct, and failed to take the appropriate steps
to halt it.0 ° The victim in the case, however, was of mixed em-
ployee-student status.8" Annabelle Lipsett was a resident at the
University of Puerto Rico medical school when she was sexually
harassed by the chief resident and several male attending physi-
cians. 2 The harassment consisted of many sexually derogatory
comments in her presence, an environment featuring nude photos
of women in the physician resting facilities, an atmosphere gen-
erally adverse to female physicians, and ultimately, the assign-
ment of first-year resident duties to Lipsett, a second-year resi-
dent.
3
In granting Lipsett's appeal of the lower court's grant of sum-
mary judgment for the defendants, the First Circuit found that
Lipsett could have made a prima facie case of sexual harassment
in violation of Title IX.' The court looked to Title VII because the
case involved an employer and a student-Lipsett was trained by
the university but also paid a salary. 5 Relying on a house report
and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
guidelines, the court stated that it had no difficulty extending Ti-
tle VII standards of liability to the instant case because it con-
cerned treatment by a supervisor in a "mixed employment-
training context." 6 The court, however, limited its holding only to
79. The Lipsett case also included allegations of quid pro quo sexual harassment, but
the court focused the majority of its opinion on addressing the hostile environment claim.
See Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 902-03 (1st Cir. 1988).
80. Id. at 901.
81. Id. at 897.
82. Id. at 884.
83. See id. at 886-94.
84. Id. at 914.
85. Id. at 897.
86. Id.
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the context of Title IX sexual harassment claims in the employ-
ment context.87 Nothing but a Title VII claim in disguise, it is not
surprising that Lipsett relied on Title VII's negligence standard in
deciding the case."8
The Seventh Circuit, in contrast, was the first federal court to
apply the negligence standard of "knew or should have known" to
a case of wholly employee-student sexual harassment in Deborah
0. v. Lake Central School Corp. 9 In an unpublished decision, the
court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin for the
proposition that a school could be liable for sexual harassment by
one of its teachers,9" but had to reach for one of its own Title VII
cases for the standard of liability.91 The plaintiff would have to
show that the school "knew or should have known about the har-
assment and yet failed to take appropriate remedial action."92 It
is unclear from the opinion whether the court was drawn to this
standard by the Supreme Court's mention of Meritor in Franklin,
but plainly absent is any corroboration for such an adoption in
the teacher-student context.
Leading up to the Gebser decision, the Second Circuit in 1995
and the Eighth Circuit in 1996 similarly adopted negligence stan-
dards pulled straight from Title VII case law.93 In quick succes-
87. Id. The court based this on the fact that both the EEOC guideline entitled "Proce-
dures for Complaints of Employment Discrimination Filed Against Recipients of Federal
Financial Assistance," 28 C.F.R. § 42.604 (1987), and the House Report accompanying Ti-
tle IX, H.R. Rep. No. 92-554, at 2462 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462, 2512,
refer to "employment-related claims under Title IX." Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 897.
88. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland case of Ward v.
Johns Hopkins Univ., 861 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1994), closely mirrors Lipsett. There, two
employees of Johns Hopkins University claimed that another employee of the university
had sexually harassed them. Id. at 369. The court determined that the plaintiffs' Title IX
claims were best analyzed through Title VII's substantive law considering Title IX's legis-
lative history and the Supreme Court's directive to give Title IX "a sweep as broad as its
language." Id. at 375 (quoting N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. at 521). Accordingly,
the court held that a plaintiff must show that an educational institution had actual or con-
structive knowledge of the unlawful conduct and failed to take prompt and sufficient ac-
tion to remedy the situation. Id. at 376.
89. See No. 94-3804, 1995 WL 431414, at *4 (7th Cir. July 21, 1995).
90. Id. (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992)).
91. See id. (citing Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 535 (7th Cir. 1993)).
92. Id. at *4 (citing Saxton, 10 F.3d at 535).
93. See Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 469 (8th Cir. 1996); Murray v.
N.Y. Univ. Coll. of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249-50 (2d Cir. 1995).
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sion, district courts from the Eastern District of Virginia and the
Northern District of Illinois followed suit. 9"
2. Vicarious Liability: The Doctrine of Respondeat Superior
The first federal court to apply agency principles to a claim un-
der Title IX was the United States District Court for the District
of Kansas in Hastings v. Hancock.95 The primary issue for the
court in Hastings was whether the harasser was aided by the
agency relationship with the school district.96 Although the court
noted that the law of the Tenth Circuit did not support a finding
of liability based merely on the existence of the employment rela-
tionship,97 it employed a recognized agency theory of liability
when it adopted the "aided by the agency relationship" stan-
dard.9" Moreover, the court stated an additional avenue of liabil-
ity under agency law-if the plaintiff could show that the ha-
rasser held a supervisory position, direct liability could be
asserted because the educational institution could not defend it-
self by arguing no actual notice. 99
The Sixth Circuit subsequently adopted agency principles by
concluding that Title VII standards should be used in claims
brought under Title IX. In Doe v. Claiborne County, the court held
that Title VII agency principles applied to a Title IX claim when a
physical education teacher entered into a sexual relationship with
a fourteen-year-old student of the high school because "[the
teacher] was an agent of the School Board." °° The court under-
stood the Supreme Court in Franklin to have implicitly approved
the use of Title VII agency standards in Title IX claims, and also
looked to Title IX's legislative history as well as statements by
the OCR.1 °1 Although an agency standard of liability is arguably
negligence couched in decorative language, it implicates impor-
94. See Slaughter v. Waubonsee Cmty. Coll., No. 94-C-2525, 1995 WL 579296, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 1995); Kadiki v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 892 F. Supp. 746, 749-51
(E.D. Va. 1995). For a summary of the facts and holdings of these cases, see Ellison, supra
note 11, at 2101-04.
95. 842 F. Supp. 1315, 1318-20 (D. Kan. 1993).
96. See id. at 1319.
97. Id.
98. See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
99. Hastings, 842 F. Supp. at 1320.
100. See 103 F.3d 495, 500, 503, 514-15 (6th Cir. 1996).
101. Id. at 514.
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tant policy considerations associated with the doctrine of respon-
deat superior. 102
3. Actual Notice and Deliberate Indifference
Prior to Gebser, the Fifth Circuit was the only federal court of
appeals to reject agency principles and other theories of liability
in favor of a standard based on an educational institution's actual
knowledge of the sexual harassment. The court did so in a series
of three cases in which it first rejected agency law and subse-
quently required notice in order to find liability under Title IX. In
the first case in the series, Canutillo Independent School District
v. Leija, the court held that the school district was not liable after
a gym teacher sexually abused two second-grade students be-
cause notice was only provided to the students' homeroom teacher
who did not alert a school official of the misconduct." 3 The court
rejected agency principles in its analysis but failed to adopt any
particular standard of liability, concluding that the students'
claim would fail under any standard other than one based on
agency principles.o 4
Shortly thereafter, however, the Fifth Circuit did adopt a stan-
dard of liability that foreshadowed the Supreme Court's an-
nounced rule in Gebser. In Rosa H. v. San Elizario Independent
School District, the student-plaintiff alleged a Title IX violation
arising from a sexual relationship between herself and a twenty-
nine-year-old karate instructor employed by the school.10 5 Upon
learning of the inappropriate relationship, the school began moni-
toring closely karate classes at the school, but failed to conduct a
full investigation, notify the school's Title IX coordinator, or re-
port the relationship to law enforcement.0 6 Unlike the situation
in Leija, this set of facts forced the court to show its hand. It held
that in order for a school district to be liable under Title IX, a
school official with the power to take remedial action must have
actual knowledge of the abuse and fail to take action to remedy
it.10 7 In so holding, the court in Rosa H. concluded that Title IX
102. See infra notes 211-21 and accompanying text.
103. See 101 F.3d 393, 402 (5th Cir. 1996).
104. See id. at 400.
105. See 106 F.3d 648, 650 (5th Cir. 1997).
106. Id. at 651.
107. Id. at 660.
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liability based on agency principles was inherently inconsistent
with the Spending Clause."O' It also noted that neither the text of
the amendment nor its regulations supported the use of agency
principles." 9 Finally, it concluded that nothing in Franklin com-
pelled the court to apply agency principles to Title IX actions.'10
An important distinction exists, however, between the rule
adopted by Rosa H. and the current rule created by Gebser. The
Fifth Circuit in Rosa H. concluded its opinion by stating that li-
ability could attach to the school district without actual knowl-
edge of the particular instance of abuse alleged by the student-
plaintiff."1 Instead, a student-plaintiff could succeed in asserting
a Title IX claim by showing that the educational institution was
aware that the harasser "posed a substantial risk of harassing
students in general.""' 2 Although dicta and adjacent to an es-
chewal of a negligence standard, this statement resembles the
holdings of later decisions that have attempted to limit Gebser
and reintroduce negligence and constructive notice into Title
ix. 113
4. Other Standards of Liability
Several other standards of liability emerged in the period be-
fore Gebser, but their application was not wide spread. At one ex-
treme, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York held that a university may escape liability under Ti-
tle IX for alleged sexual harassment by one of its employees so
long as it provides a reasonable procedure through which stu-
dents can notify an appropriate official." 4 The court held the uni-
versity not liable because it had a policy against sexual harass-
ment in place and had implemented a complaint procedure of
which all students and faculties were aware." 5 While this holding
108. Id. at 654 ("As a statute enacted under the Spending Clause, Title IX should not
generate liability unless the recipient of federal funds agreed to assume the liability.").
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 659.
112. Id.
113. See infra text accompanying notes 228-47.
114. See Pallett v. Palma, 914 F. Supp. 1018, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated, Kracunas
v. Iona Coll., 119 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1997).
115. Id. at 1025. The court lambasted the students' decision to bring the suit:
That a faculty member on occasion will violate the published policies of an in-
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is distinct from most other courts, it does bring into question
whether the standard of liability should differ for universities and
primary or secondary schools. Commentators have argued that
actual notice is an inappropriate standard because minor stu-
dent-victims of sexual harassment often lack the maturity to un-
derstand that the misconduct should be reported or are afraid of
the stigmatization that accompanies reporting it." 6 Although the
latter may still hold true in some university situations, college
students between eighteen and twenty-two years of age unques-
tionably possess a higher level of understanding of what consti-
tutes sexual harassment than elementary students. The Supreme
Court has yet to consider the maturity of the victim in fashioning
its Title IX jurisprudence, but it is worth considering how a stan-
dard that varies according to the maturity level of the victim
would effect a balance between the need to eradicate sexual har-
assment and protect educational institutions from over-exposure
to damages.
At the other extreme, at least one federal court has imposed
strict liability on educational institutions for Title IX claims of
sexual harassment. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri in Bolon v. Rolla Public Schools
stated that any intentional act of discrimination by an employee
of a school would be imputed to the school district under the prin-
ciples of respondeat superior.117 The court described that stan-
dard as strict liability, and offered numerous public policy rea-
sons to support its holding." 8 For example, the court cited this
nation's mandatory requirement that children attend school as
supporting a rule protecting children in all situations of school
employee misconduct.19 Moreover, the court touched upon an oft-
cited weakness in the actual knowledge standard-in theory,
stitution and do so clandestinely, as here, is not a basis for students or em-
ployees who have eschewed the established procedures for rectifying the
wrong done to them, to run instead to the courts, to mulct the charitable
funds of a non-profit teaching institution. Those funds could be used better
for the instruction of other students.
Id. at 1024. If anything, the court's sharp rebuke supports arguments for different stan-
dards of liability for primary or secondary schools and universities or colleges, where, in
the latter case, an avenue for complaining may prove more effective in providing relief.
116. See, e.g., Fermeen Fazal, Is Actual Notice an Actual Remedy? A Critique of Gebser
v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1033, 1056 (1999).
117. 917 F. Supp. 1423, 1427 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
118. Id. at 1428-29.
119. See id. at 1428.
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schools could shield themselves from liability by "clos[ing] their
eyes to the problem."12 ° Still, strict liability for our schools may be
holding the publicly funded institutions to too high a standard,
even considering the Supreme Court's directive to give Title IX "'a
sweep as broad as its language. ''121
B. The Gebser Decision and the Adoption of Actual Notice and
Deliberate Indifference
The Gebser decision settled discrepancies among the lower
courts' application of a standard of liability to educational institu-
tions in Title IX actions, or at least most courts have interpreted
it as accomplishing such. Essentially, Gebser created a two-part
test for determining whether liability for the sexual harassment
committed by one of its employees should be imputed to an educa-
tional institution. First, an employee with the authority to correct
the wrongdoing must have actual notice of it. 122 Second, the au-
thorized employee must demonstrate a deliberate indifference to
the wrongdoing. 123
In Gebser, an eighth-grade student was the victim of sexual
harassment at the hands of one of Lago Vista high school's teach-
ers, Frank Waldrop, during an after-school book club. 124 After
continuing for nearly a year, the unlawful relationship was fi-
nally discovered when a police officer witnessed Waldrop and the
student having sexual intercourse. 125 The student brought a
number of claims under Title IX, § 1983, and state negligence
laws. 126 The United States District Court for the Western District
of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the school on all
claims, holding that the school lacked actual notice of Waldrop's
behavior. 127 The only indication of the behavior was the parents'
120. Id. at 1429.
121. See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (quoting United States
v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)).
122. See Gebser v. Lago Ind. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998); Jeremy Beck, Entity
Liability for Teacher-on-Student Sexual Harassment: Could State Law Offer Greater Pro-
tection than Federal Statutes?, 35 J.L. & EDUC. 141, 143 (2006).
123. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277; Beck, supra note 122, at 143.
124. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.
125. Id. at 278. Waldrop's teaching license was revoked and Lago Vista terminated his
employment after the relationship was discovered. Id.
126. Id. at 278-79.
127. Id. at 279.
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complaint about his offensive comments in class, and the district
court found this insufficient to create constructive notice.12 The
student appealed only the Title IX claim, but the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed, holding that strict liability or respondeat superior was
"inconsistent with 'the Title IX contract,"' and that there was in-
sufficient evidence to show the school should have known about
the unlawful conduct. 1
29
On the granting of certiorari by the Supreme Court, the peti-
tioner pushed for the adoption of one of two standards of institu-
tional liability. First, the petitioner argued that the Court should
follow the guidance of a 1997 policy statement issued by the OCR,
which stated that a school should be found liable when a teacher
"is 'aided in carrying out the sexual harassment of students by his
or her position of authority with the institution,"'130 which would
certainly include most instances of teacher-on-student sexual
harassment. Essentially, this is respondeat superior liability.13'
In the alternative, the petitioner urged the court to adopt a the-
ory of constructive notice, where the school would be liable when
its administrators should have known of the unlawful conduct. 132
Both of these theories of liability would result in a broader appli-
cation of Title IX liability than the actual notice standard applied
by the lower courts.
The Supreme Court, however, refused to adopt either of the pe-
titioner's theories of liability. It specifically found that agency
principles were not appropriate in determining institutional li-
ability in a Title IX action because, unlike Title VII, Title IX pro-
vides no reference to "agent" or definition for "employer."133
Therefore, Congress did not expressly call for the application of
agency principles. 134 In refusing to adopt a constructive notice
standard, which is essentially a negligence standard, the Court
noted that because the private damage remedy under Title IX
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1225 (5th Cir.
1997)).
130. Id. at 282 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 36, Gebser v. Lago Indep. Sch. Dist., 524
U.S. 274 (1997) (No. 96-1866) (quoting Office for Civil Rights; Sexual Harassment Policy
Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Par-
ties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,039 (Mar. 13, 1997))).
131. See infra text accompanying notes 166-72.
132. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 282.
133. See id. at 283.
134. See id. at 285.
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was judicially crafted, it had significant leeway in interpreting
the statute's scope, as long as the purpose of the statute would
not be frustrated.135 The Court thus looked to Congress's likely
intention with respect to the scope of Title IX. 16
Title IX was passed in the era of the civil rights statutes.
13 7
These statutes expressly provided for private remedies, however,
and were limited to injunctive and equitable relief, not the unlim-
ited recovery afforded by strict liability. 3 ' It was not until 1991
that Congress expressly made damages available under Title VII,
and even then it carefully limited them to a maximum amount. 1
39
The Court in Gebser noted that adopting the petitioner's position
would allow unlimited recovery when Congress had not spoken on
either the right or the remedy and when it had carefully limited
the amount of recovery in another context. 4 ° According to the
Court, whereas Title VII focuses on compensating victims for past
discrimination, Title IX aims to protect individuals from dis-
crimination. '4 1 If that is the case, however, it is confusing why the
Court extended Title IX beyond injunctive or equitable relief in
the first place.
The Court relied on other aspects of Title IX to provide further
support for its decision not to base liability on constructive notice
or agency principles. It likened the granting of federal funds un-
der Title IX to a contract between the receiving institution and
the government.'42 The receiving institution essentially promises
not to discriminate in exchange for the receipt of federal fund-
ing.143 The Court doubted that Congress intended for a breach of
this "contract" to occur without the actual knowledge of one of the
135. Id. at 284-85.
136. See id. at 285-86.
137. See id. at 285; supra note 18 and accompanying text.
138. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285-86.
139. Id. at 286 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(b)(3) (2000)).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 286-87.
142. Id. at 286.
143. Id. The conditioning of federal funding on state action is fairly common, and the
Supreme Court has declared it constitutional under the Taxing and Spending Clause. See,
e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of
conditioning federal highway funds on states raising the minimum drinking age to twenty-
one). See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States . ..").
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contracting parties.144 Furthermore, the Court considered the
administrative enforcement of Title IX. The OCR cannot instigate
an enforcement action against an educational institution without
first notifying the "appropriate person or persons of the failure to
comply with the requirement and [the agency] has determined
that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means." '145 Also,
the OCR should consider whether the receiving institution can
bring itself into compliance with Title IX through voluntary
means.'46 The Court construes this administrative procedure as
resting on the policy that federal funds should not be diverted
"from beneficial uses" when institutions are unaware of the sex-
ual harassment and are willing to institute corrective meas-
ures.14 In sum, the Court was extremely wary of creating or ex-
tending a judicially implied remedy for Title IX that far exceeded
the scope of the express remedy supplied by Congress.
Instead, the Court stated that the target entity of a Title IX ac-
tion must have actual notice. 48 More specifically, to impute liabil-
ity to the recipient institution, a person within the institution
who possesses the authority to address the wrongdoing and im-
plement corrective measures must have actual notice.'49 The
Court limited this requirement to instances that "do not involve
official policy of the recipient entity." 150 In a case concerning offi-
cial policy, it is unclear whether a constructive notice theory of li-
ability or a strict liability approach would apply. Unfortunately,
the Court also failed to define what would constitute official pol-
icy.
The Court also required that for liability to attach to the insti-
tution-even if there is actual notice as the Court defines it-the
recipient institution must exhibit deliberate indifference to the
unlawful conduct.' 5 This standard of deliberate indifference was
taken directly from the requirement of deliberate indifference for
144. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287-88.
145. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000).
146. Id.
147. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 289.
148. Id. at 285.
149. Id. at 290.
150. Id. Circuit courts have leveraged this statement by the Court to limit the applica-
tion of Gebser. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
151. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.
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a § 1983 claim. 5 2 Moreover, the mere failure to institute an offi-
cial grievance process for sexual harassment claims, which is re-
quired under DOE regulations, would not give rise to liability
without more. 1
53
V. CRITICISM OF GEBSER-IS IT FOUNDED?
Gebser is the Supreme Court's most criticized Title IX case.'54
The gravamen of recent criticism is that Gebser and Davis repre-
sent a sharp turnaround in the Supreme Court's position on the
intended scope of Title IX with respect to sexual harassment.
15
The contrast between the prior pronouncement of the Court that
the statute should be given a "sweep as broad as its language,"156
and the limiting of institutional liability by Gebser and Davis, has
not gone unnoticed.'57 Essentially, commentators have accused
the Court of gutting Title IX and creating "'an almost insur-
mountable hurdle for a victim hoping to prove the school li-
able."' 151 In other words, if courts continue to require that the
terms "actual knowledge" and "deliberate indifference" mean
more than a complaint by a sexually abused student to a princi-
pal or guidance counselor and mere inaction by the recipient of
the knowledge, plaintiffs will be unsuccessful in their Title IX
claims. 159
152. Id. at 291 ("Comparable considerations led to our adoption of a deliberate indiffer-
ence standard for claims under § 1983 alleging that a municipality's actions in failing to
prevent a deprivation of federal rights was the cause of the violation." (citing Bd. of
Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997))).
153. Id. at 291-92. The DOE regulations require each educational institution receiving
funding to "adopt and publish grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable
resolution of student and employee complaints alleging any action which would be prohib-
ited by [Title IX]." 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (2006).
154. See Callie R. Owen, Silence Broken: Gebser's New Standard of School Liability for
Title IX Sexual Harassment, 87 KY. L.J. 815, 827, 837-38 (1999).
155. See, e.g., William E. Thro & Brian A. Snow, The Subtle Implications of Gebser v.
Lago Vista Independent School District, 141 EDUC. L. REP. 409, 436 (2000).
156. See N. Haven Bd. Of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (quoting United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)).
157. See Cherner-Ranft, supra note 15, at 1910.
158. See id. (quoting Anne D. Byrne, Note, School Liability Under Title IX for Sexual
Abuse of a Student By a Teacher: Why Has the Supreme Court Allowed Schools To Put
Their Heads in the Sand? Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 188 S. Ct.
1989 (1998), 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 587, 614 (1999)).
159. See id. at 1920-21.
1280 [Vol. 42:1257
REVIEW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. What About Alternative Avenues of Relief for Sexual
Harassment?
As many commentators have argued, the Gebser standard ap-
pears to dampen Title IX's influence on sexual harassment in
educational institutions. 60 Student-victims seeking relief may
encounter difficulty in satisfying the two-prong test under Gebser
necessary to hold the institution liable.'61 Little attention, how-
ever, has been given to the fact that there is another course of ac-
tion under Title IX. If the alternative course is successful, then
the ill effects of Gebser may be exaggerated.
1. The Possibility of Student-Victims Reporting Sexual
Harassment to the Office of Civil Rights
Still operating under the Title IX framework, victims could at-
tempt to persuade the OCR to conduct its own investigation and
thereby prompt the withholding of federal funds. This course of
action, however, is unlikely on two accounts. First, the withhold-
ing of federal funds by the DOE would provide no relief to the vic-
tim of the sexual harassment. 62 Therefore, student-victims lack
pecuniary motivation to pursue this avenue of redress. Second,
since Title IX was passed in 1972, the DOE has failed to withhold
federal funding from an educational institution on even one occa-
sion.'63 Perhaps the threat of withholding alone prompts educa-
tional institutions to address the unlawful conduct. Or, perhaps
the OCR wants to avoid depriving schools of funds that ulti-
mately benefit the very students Title IX is designed to protect.164
Whatever the reason, student-victims of sexual harassment are
unlikely to waste time attempting to persuade a governmental
160. See, e.g., id. at 1919.
161. See id. at 1920.
162. While the threat of withholding funds could prompt the educational institution to
make changes to protect future students, that would not compensate the victim for past
harm.
163. See Julie A. Davies & Lisa M. Bohon, Re-Imagining Public Enforcement of Title
IX, 2007 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 25, 41. In Franklin v. Gwinnet County Public Schools, the
sexually harassed student filed a complaint with the OCR, which in turn found that the
district had violated Title IX. 503 U.S. 60, 64 n.3 (1992). The coach resigned, however, and
the district commenced a sexual harassment policy. Id. The OCR subsequently determined
that the district had come into compliance with Title IX, and did not withhold federal
monies. Id.
164. See Davies & Bohon, supra note 163, at 41.
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agency to take an action that it has failed to take in over twenty-
five years. Moreover, although it is an unfair generalization to
characterize student-victims as motivated solely by the prospect
of monetary relief, it is indisputably a factor in a decision to re-
veal an embarrassing situation by filing a lawsuit.
2. The Prospect of Student-Victims Seeking Relief Under
Common Law
While Title IX is the only federal statute providing redress for
student-victims of sexual harassment, 165 plaintiffs have sought
redress under common law. Similar to the prospect of reporting
allegations of sexual harassment to the OCR, if common law suits
prove successful, the results should undermine criticism of Geb-
ser. The following discussion of the different avenues of common
law relief, however, exemplifies their shortcomings in defeating
the sexual harassment epidemic.
a. Common Law Vicarious Liability
Student-victims of sexual harassment have attempted to bring
state common law claims of vicarious liability against educational
institutions, alleging that the institution is liable under the the-
ory of respondeat superior. In the case of Medlin v. Bass, for ex-
165. A student-victim could also bring a § 1983 claim, but the prospect of success is
unlikely. Section 1983 provides that liability shall attach only to "[elvery person who, un-
der color of any statute ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). An educational institution will rarely be held
liable under § 1983 because the statute only applies where an institution adopts a specific
policy or custom of sexual harassment. See Bd. of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 403-04 (1997) (holding that a municipality can only be liable under § 1983 if the
plaintiff shows "deliberate conduct" on the part of the municipality); Monell v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (determining that a local government can only be li-
able for its own policies and customs, and "cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respon-
deat superior theory"). Thus, the statute will not provide redress to a student-victim vis-A-
vis the educational institution where a coach or teacher has committed sexual harassment
with a personal motive. Section 1983 claims may be brought against individuals for viola-
tion of a student-victim's equal protection rights. See generally Hoehne, supra note 20 (dis-
cussing a multitude of § 1983 actions against teachers, principals, and schools). With the
average teacher making about $47,000 per year, Press Release, Am. Fed'n of Teachers,
AFT Salary Survey: Teachers Need 30 Percent Raise (Mar. 29, 2007), available at
http://www.aft.org/presscenter/releases/2007/032907.htm, however, student victims stand
to reap little financial redress from bringing § 1983 claims against teachers who have
committed sexual harassment. Moreover, several United States courts of appeal have held
that Title IX preempts a § 1983 claim. See Hoehne, supra note 20, at 3190.
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ample, the plaintiff, as guardian ad litem for her minor daughter,
brought an action against the defendant, Vann J. Bass, the prin-
cipal of the victim's high school.'66 Through an amended com-
plaint, the minor plaintiff joined the school board as an additional
defendant, alleging that it negligently hired Bass and that be-
cause Bass's conduct was within the scope of his employment, li-
ability should be imputed to the board. '67 The court disagreed,
however, holding that because the school board had followed
through in contacting two of Bass's three references, it had dis-
charged its duty to investigate Bass prior to hiring him and could
not reasonably have known of his pedophilic tendencies. 6 ' The
court's holding was not shaken by the fact that another principal
had made the school board aware of a rumor that Bass was ho-
mosexual. '69
The court's analysis of whether Bass was acting within the
scope of his employment is particularly important because pre-
Gebser courts and commentators have argued for the adoption of
agency principles in Title IX cases. 7 ' On account of their sexual
nature, Bass's acts were held to be "intentional tortious acts de-
signed to carry out an independent purpose," and therefore not
within the scope of his employment.' 7 ' The dissent argued that a
jury could find the assault to have occurred within Bass's scope of
employment because he brought the minor plaintiff into his office
to discipline her for truancy-an act clearly within the scope of
his employment.'72
Not all student-victims of sexual harassment have been unsuc-
cessful in imputing liability to educational institutions, however.
Medlin stands in stark contrast to a 2004 case from the United
States District Court for the District of Nevada. In Doe v. Green,
the victim, a fourteen-year-old female high school student, and
her parents brought a respondeat superior action as well as a Ti-
tle IX claim against Mojave High School for acts committed by
166. 398 S.E.2d 460, 461 (N.C. 1990).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 461-62.
169. Id. at 462.
170. See id. at 466 (Martin, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 95-102 and accompany-
ing text.
171. Medlin, 398 S.E.2d at 464.
172. Id. at 465 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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Doe's assistant soccer coach, Jeremy Green.173 Green-also a spe-
cial education teacher-entered into a sexual relationship with
Doe after several months of courting and flirtatious behavior.174
The court looked to Nevada's lengthy history of common law to
find that 'the proper inquiry [was] not whether the wrongful act
itself was authorized but whether it was committed in the course
of a series of acts of the agent which were authorized by the prin-
cipal."'175 According to the court, because the school board vested
authority in Green to direct and discipline students, and to oth-
erwise have substantial and prolonged contact with them, the
school district was subject to respondeat superior liability for the
acts committed by Green during those times when he should have
been engaging in his duties as a coach and instructor. 176
The stark contrast in these two decisions illustrates the incon-
gruity among lower courts in determining a teacher's scope of
employment. Thus, common law respondeat superior liability is
not only a poor alternative to Title IX, but forewarns of the incon-
sistent result should the Supreme Court abrogate Gebser and in-
ject agency principles into Title IX.
b. Negligence in Hiring
Another Title IX alternative for student-victims of sexual har-
assment is to bring an action against an educational institution
for negligently hiring a teacher or coach who commits an unlaw-
ful sexual act.177 In some jurisdictions, a school or other educa-
tional institution may defeat a claim for negligence in hiring an
employee who has sexually harassed a student just by obtaining
references and interviewing the applicant. For example, in
Murray v. Research Foundation of State University of New York,
Reginald Wright, an employee of the Foundation, sexually as-
173. 298 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1028 (D. Nev. 2004). For a discussion of the Title IX claim in
Green, see infra text accompanying notes 244-47.
174. Green, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 1028, 1030.
175. Id. at 1042 (quoting Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Jimenez, 935 P.2d 274, 281 (Nev.
1997), opinion withdrawn, reh'g dismissed by Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Jimenez, 941
P.2d 969 (Nev. 1997)).
176. Id.
177. In order to establish such a claim, a plaintiff must generally show that the institu-
tion possessed a duty to exercise reasonable care in hiring, that the institution breached
that duty by knowingly hiring an incompetent teacher, and that the hiring of the incompe-
tent teacher proximately caused the student-victim's injury. Beck, supra note 122, at 145.
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saulted the plaintiffs son in his office over a six-month period. 7 '
The Foundation responded by showing "that it conducted an ex-
tensive interview and obtained written references prior to hiring
Wright."'79 The court held that in the absence of any information
leading a reasonable person to suspect Wright of a tendency to
commit sexual harassment, the Foundation was under no duty to
investigate Wright beyond interviewing and obtaining refer-
ences. 0 Likewise, because the Foundation "neither knew nor had
reason to know that Wright posed a risk to children," it was not
negligent in retaining him. 181
In other jurisdictions, however, legislative enactments place
higher duties on educational institutions in hiring employees.1 2
In Mueller v. Community Consolidated School District 54, for ex-
ample, the minor-plaintiff was the student manager of a junior
high school wrestling team.8 3 After riding with the wrestling
coach, Anthony Robinson, back to Robinson's house under the
guise of working on a personnel roster, the minor-plaintiff was
sexually assaulted.8 4 She then sued the school district, alleging
violation of a state statute requiring criminal background
checks."8 ' The school district argued, among other things, that the
statute was designed to protect the public at large and imposed
no "duty to protect individual members of the public absent a spe-
cial relationship."8 6 The court rejected that argument, holding
that the statute was intended to protect a specific class of indi-
viduals-school children-and not the public at large.8 7 Because
the statute applied, the minor-plaintiff did not need to show that
the school district was aware of the danger that Anthony Robin-
178. See 723 N.Y.S.2d 805, 806-07 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
179. Id. at 807.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Illinois, for example, has enacted a statute that requires schools to initiate a
criminal background check prior to hiring an employee. See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-1
(2006). This essentially creates negligence per se liability when a school hires a teacher or
coach without initiating the background check and the teacher or coach sexually harasses
a student.
183. 678 N.E.2d 660, 662 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 663.
186. Id. at 667 (citing Arizzi v. City of Chicago, 559 N.E.2d 68, 70 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)).
187. Id.
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son posed to its students in order to advance her per se negligence
claim. 1 8
8
The law for negligent hiring of teachers is plagued by the same
uniformity concerns as common law respondeat superior. As
Mueller illustrates, local legislatures are willing to impose a
higher standard of background checks for teachers, which-
coupled with federalism concerns-arguably reinforces the posi-
tion that local governments are better situated to pass education
related legislation. That argument is beyond the scope of this
comment, however, and a uniform solution will undoubtedly have
the most immediate effect on the sexual harassment epidemic.
c. Duty of Care to Supervise Employee Interactions with
Students
While the common law standard to exercise reasonable care in
retaining and supervising an employee closely follows the stan-
dard for hiring an employee, schools may be under a higher duty
to supervise employee conduct. Two cases from New York-
Murray from 2001 and Doe v. Whitney from 2004-illustrate this
distinction. In Murray, the court analogized the duty of a school
to supervise to the supervision a reasonably prudent parent
would exercise."' The court held that a reasonably prudent par-
ent would know whether the student-victim was enrolled in
Wright's program and whether he was permitted to meet with
Wright behind closed doors.1 90
In Doe v. Whitney, the defendant Ty Whitney, a first-grade
teacher at Goshen Christian School, allegedly sexually abused a
student from the fall of 1997 until the spring of 2000.191 When the
student-plaintiff brought an action against the school for negli-
gently hiring Whitney, the court dismissed the claim because
Whitney was recommended by his previous employer and a school
board member, and the entire school board interviewed him. 192
With respect to the claim for negligent supervision, however, the
188. Id.
189. See 723 N.Y.S.2d 805, 807 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
190. Id. In Murray, the student-victim was not actually enrolled in the program, but
Wright nonetheless supplied him with passes so that he could be excused from class to
meet with Wright in his office behind a closed door. Id.
191. See 779 N.Y.S.2d 570, 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
192. Id.
1286 [Vol. 42:1257
REVIEW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
court emphasized that "'a school owes its students such care as a
parent of ordinary prudence would observe in comparable circum-
stances."'193 Because Whitney kept the student-plaintiff in the
classroom during recess and removed him from his classes on a
weekly basis without the consent of his teachers and without ex-
planation, there was a triable issue of fact on the negligent su-
pervision claim.' Therefore, the school's failure to notice the
student-plaintiff's absence from recess and unexplained removal
from classes could constitute breaches of the school's duty of su-
pervision. 115
Obviously, for very young children, this standard could act as
an effective combatant against sexual harassment. To continue
the analogy, as the need for parental supervision lessens with the
age of a child, so would the effectiveness of such a standard with
the age of a student-victim. A high school or college would have
little supervisory responsibilities over employees teaching stu-
dents in their mid-to-late teens and early twenties.
d. Educational Institution Sovereign Immunity
Unfortunately for student-victims of sexual harassment or
abuse, even if they make the requisite showing for a negligence
claim, an educational institution can still escape liability by as-
serting the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 196 As a general rule,
acts considered to be governmental are shielded from liability
whereas acts that are ministerial are not. ' The determination of
193. Id. (quoting Doe v. Orange-Ulster Bd. Of Coop. Educ. Servs., 771 N.Y.S.2d 389,
390 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. States, and their institutions, such as public schools, have sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; R. Craig Wood & Mark D.
Chestnutt, Violence in U.S. Schools: The Problems and Some Responses, 97 EDUC. L. REP.
619, 631 (1995). States can waive this immunity, however, and the Supreme Court has
held that Congress intended to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity for Title IX claims
when their public educational institutions accept federal funds. See Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1996) (discussing Congress's power to abrogate state sover-
eign immunity). With respect to common law claims against public schools for sexual har-
assment, state courts do not agree whether a public school waives its sovereign immunity
when one of its employees commits sexual harassment.
197. This distinction derives from Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in Marbury v.
Madison. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 149-50 (1803) ("It is not consistent with the policy of
our political institutions, or the manners of the citizens of the United States, that any
ministerial officer having public duties to perform, should be above the compulsion of law
in exercise of those duties.").
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which category an educational institution's act falls into has var-
ied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 198
Governmental action generally involves discretionary policy-
making and planning activities which are immune from tort li-
ability. If the action is ministerial or operational, however, and
the common law or a statute creates a duty of care, then a school
board or other agency can be held liable.'99 For example, a Florida
court of appeals overturned a lower court's finding that the Flor-
ida Department of Education had sovereign immunity when it re-
instated a teacher a few years after revoking his license for im-
pregnating a minor student."' The court distinguished govern-
mental from ministerial actions and held that the agency could be
held liable because its negligence arose from "the manner in
which [its] policies were implemented."201 If anything, the pros-
pect of educational institutions escaping liability for teacher-on-
student sexual harassment underscores the importance of an ef-
fective Title IX remedy.
There are numerous barriers to invoking institutional liability
under common law; for educational institutions in particular,
they can prove insurmountable. From common law respondeat
superior liability to negligence in hiring or supervision, lack of
uniformity makes the common law a poor alternative to Title IX.
Moreover, even if a student-victim successfully proves a sexual
harassment claim, educational institutions can still argue for sov-
ereign immunity. Up to this part of the analysis, commentators
appear correct in asserting that Gebser has undercut the only vi-
able remedy for student-victims of sexual harassment.
B. Is Respondeat Superior Really the Answer?
One of the more prominent attacks on Gebser has focused on
the Court's rejection of vicarious liability for educational institu-
tions.20 2 In fact, many commentators urged the Court to adopt
agency principles in crafting the standard of liability well before
198. See Wood & Chestnutt, supra note 196, at 631.
199. See id.
200. See Ingram v. Wylie, 875 So. 2d 680, 681-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
201. Id. at 682.
202. See Cohen, supra note 2, at 352-57.
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the Gebser decision.2"3 Those commentators surveyed the various
standards employed by lower courts and argued that agency prin-
ciples would best effectuate Title IX's scope and congressional in-
tent.204
To a certain extent, commentators accurately predicted the
outcome and rationale the Court adopted in Gebser. For example,
one commentator noted the absence of the word "agent" or "em-
ployer" in the statutory language of Title IX, which contrasts with
the express language of Title VII.205 The majority opinion in Geb-
ser made an identical observation in justifying its dismissal of the
application of agency principles to Title IX. 206 Commentators have
rebuked this reasoning, however, with three arguments. First,
the relationship between a teacher and a student resembles the
relationship between an agent and a third-party.2 7 Second, Title
VII, to which courts have consistently applied agency principles,
concerns the same subject matter, only in the employment con-
text. 2" Third, commentators interpreted the Franklin decision as
authorizing the application of respondeat superior in the Title IX
context .209 All of these points, however, appear to be rooted in the
underlying argument that applying any standard other than one
based on agency principles would both render Title IX ineffective
in fulfilling Congress's intent to provide relief to student-victims
of sexual harassment and ignore the Supreme Court's directive to
give the amendment a "broad sweep."210
In pushing for the adoption of agency principles in Title IX
analyses, however, commentators and the Court in Gebser failed
to consider the modern theory and policy basis for vicarious liabil-
ity in the educational context. The modern theory behind respon-
deat superior liability is that the employer is in a better position
to assume the risk of liability than either the employee or the in-
203. See, e.g., Stacy, supra note 14, at 1367.
204. See generally Ellison, supra note 11; Stacy, supra note 14.
205. See Stacy, supra note 14, at 1367.
206. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283 (1998).
207. Stacy, supra note 14, at 1367-68.
208. See id. at 1368.
209. See id. at 1369-70. In its opinion, the Court in Franklin alluded to Meritor, a Title
VII case that invoked the use of agency principles in analyzing the liability of an employer.
See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (citing Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
210. See N. Haven Bd. ofEduc. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (quoting United States
v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)).
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jured plaintiff.211 The employer can better absorb the cost of li-
ability by distributing it to its customers through higher prices.
212
Moreover, the employer is well-equiped to understand the risks of
liability and has access to lower insurance rates than the injured
plaintiff or employee.21 3 Therefore, vicarious liability makes eco-
nomic sense because risk and liability are allotted to the party
best able to mitigate them.214
Accordingly, the question that should be posed in determining
whether vicarious liability should apply to Title IX is: are educa-
tional institutions as well-suited to assume the risk of respondeat
superior liability as private employers? Unfortunately, courts and
commentators have generally skipped this level of analysis and
vaulted directly into questions of which type of respondeat supe-
rior liability should apply-apparent authority or the agency re-
lationship's role in aiding sexual harassment, 215 and whether the
sexual harassment occurred within the employee's scope of em-
ployment.21 6
The economic situation of educational institutions that receive
federal funding is vastly different from that of a private corpora-
tion. Universities may be able to raise tuition to cover the cost of
liability that may result from sexual harassment suits, 217 but pri-
mary and secondary schools lack fiscal control.218 Most public
211. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 459 (4th ed.
1971).
212. See, e.g., Laura L. Hirschfeld, Legal Drugs? Not Without Legal Reform: The Impact
of Drug Legalization on Employers Under Current Theories of Enterprise Liability, 7
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 757, 794-95 (1998).
213. See Christopher E. Krueger, Note, Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles: Should a City
Be Held Liable Under Respondeat Superior For a Rape by a Police Officer?, 28 U.S.F. L.
REV. 419, 424 (1994).
214. See Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of
the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 565
(1988).
215. See, e.g., Stacy, supra note 14, at 1371.
216. See supra notes 165-76 and accompanying text.
217. Nearly all universities across the country have raised tuition in recent years, often
significantly. See Dennis Cauchon, Grants More than Offset Soaring University Tuition,
USA TODAY, June 27, 2004, at 4A, available at http://www.usatoday.con/news/nation/
2004-06-27-demystifying-tuitionx.htm.
218. Local property taxes constitute the largest source of funding for public schools in
most jurisdictions. Stewart E. Sterk & Mitchell L. Engler, Property Tax Reassessment:
Who Needs It?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1037, 1037 (2006); see also U.S. Dep't of Educ., 10
Facts About K-12 Education Funding, http://www.ed.gov./about/overview/fed/10facts/in
dex.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2008) ("In the 2004-05 school year, 83 cents out of every dol-
lar spent on education is estimated to come from the state and local levels."). While public
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educational institutions also operate on very strict budgets, and
do not have the deep pockets of many corporations. Therefore, it
is questionable whether schools are able to bear the risk of liabil-
ity in the same way a corporation can.
The prospect of obtaining insurance coverage presents a par-
ticularly difficult issue for educational institutions, and ironically,
the Gebser decision has all but eliminated the option of Title IX
insurance coverage. Under a standard of liability based on agency
principles, courts could conceivably rule that a general liability
insurance policy covers monetary damages awarded under a Title
IX claim because the school did not necessarily commit an inten-
tional tort.219 This possibility, although perhaps unlikely, was
nonetheless squelched by Gebser, because the standard for insti-
tutional liability under Title IX now requires that the educational
institution act with deliberate indifference.220 A court would al-
most certainly consider an act of deliberate indifference to be an
intentional act, which is uninsurable in the marketplace.221
Consequently, the inability of educational institutions to bear
the risk of liability arising from Title IX claims distinguishes
them from private corporations. This fact undermines the argu-
ment that agency principles belong in the Title IX equation. It is
surprising that the Court in Gebser did not respond to the school
district's arguments by pointing out the incongruity between the
theory of respondeat superior and the financial position of school
districts. In fact, from a deterrence standpoint, the potential im-
pact of monetary damages on educational institutions' strained
budgets should motivate them to institute higher levels of super-
vision for teachers, coaches, and other employees. Perhaps the
Gebser decision illustrated the Court's unwillingness to consider
deterrence a sufficient reason to adopt agency principles in Title
IX liability.
schools could petition local government to raise taxes and allocate further funding, no gen-
eral decision-making authority with regard to funding rests with the school boards.
219. Though its decision was subsequently reversed, the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas actually found that an insurance contract covered dam-
ages arising from a Title IX claim. See Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins.
Co., 900 F. Supp. 844, 850 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 99 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1996).
220. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998).
221. Nearly all employment-related insurance policies exclude intentional or willful
conduct, and courts have upheld these exclusions. See Richard L. Suter, Insurance Cover-
age of Discrimination, Sexual Harassment and Other Employment-Related Claims, 11 ME.
B.J. 82, 86 (1996).
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C. An Empirical Test
Because so many variables exist, it may be difficult to test the
accuracy of assertions by commentators that plaintiffs' chances of
bringing successful Title IX claims will suffer in the wake of Geb-
ser. Nonetheless, what follows is an attempt to construct an em-
pirical test to gauge whether an obstacle has arisen to Title IX
claims in the nearly ten years since the Gebser decision. The cho-
sen test statistic is the grant or denial of motions for summary
judgment or dismissal on the pleadings by educational institu-
tions on Title IX sexual harassment claims. If Gebser truly
marked a shift in Title IX jurisprudence, it seems logical that the
main tools for filtering unfounded claims-grant on summary
judgment or dismissal on the pleadings-would expose such a
shift.
For the survey to be manageable, only cases heard in federal
court were examined. Two time periods were selected: cases com-
ing before the court on a motion for summary judgment or dis-
missal on the pleadings between 1996 and 1997-the two years
preceding Gebser-and cases between 2006 and 2007-a two-year
time frame nearly ten years after Gebser. Only cases concerning
teacher-student, coach-student, or peer-to-peer sexual harass-
ment were taken into account.222 Moreover, during the 2006-2007
time period, only cases that mentioned the Gebser decision were
included in the survey to ensure that the court analyzed the mo-
tion according to the test for institutional liability pronounced by
the Court in Gebser.
For the purposes of this survey, the commentators who have
criticized the Gebser decision were assumed to be correct. In other
words, it is assumed that the Gebser decision has resulted in a
222. Westlaw's online database of "all-federal" cases was searched in order to provide
the cases for the survey. For the 1996-1997 time period, the following search terms were
entered into the Terms and Connectors search box: "Title /2 IX /s sexual /2 harassment &
da(aft 1995 & bef 1998)." For the 2006-2007 time period, the following search terms were
entered into the Terms and Connectors search box: "Title /2 IX & sexual /2 harassment &
Gebser & da(aft 2005 & bef 2008)." A handful of cases from the two time periods included
cases of employer-employee sexual harassment under Title IX, but these cases were ex-
cluded from the survey. What remains are cases of peer-to-peer or teacher-student sexual
harassment. Cases that were decided on the pleadings or on summary judgment were de-
cided under the Gebser standard. Any case decided for another reason was not included
unless the court espoused its opinion on whether the case would have survived based on
the Gebser standard alone.
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higher standard of liability-actual knowledge and deliberate in-
difference-and consequently, courts should, in theory, grant
more motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss
based on the pleadings. Therefore, the null hypothesis for the
survey is that there will be significantly more grants of summary
judgment and motions to dismiss from the 2006-2007 time period
than the 1996-1997 time period because courts in the later time
period will be applying a higher standard of institutional liability.
The results are summarized and discussed below:
Motion for Summary
Judgment/Motion to Granted by Denied by Percentage
Dismiss Title IX District District of Motions
Claim by Educa- Court Court Granted
tional Institution
1997-1998 (Pre- 10 15 40.0%
Gebser)
2006-2007 (Post- 15 14 51.7%
Gebser)
There were a similar number of cases that came before the
United States district courts during the two time periods that fit
the survey's criteria. Twenty-five cases of Title IX claims for sex-
ual harassment against students were heard on motions for
summary judgment or motions to dismiss based on the pleadings
between 1996 and 1997 and twenty-nine between 2006 and 2007.
In the former time period-prior to the Supreme Court's adoption
of the actual notice and deliberate indifference standard-federal
district courts granted ten of twenty-five motions for summary
judgment or motions to dismiss on the pleadings by educational
institutions. 223 That equates to a judgment in favor of the moving
223. For the court decisions during the 1996-1997 time period granting the educational
institutions' motions for summary judgment or dismissal on the pleadings, see Doe v.
Berkeley County Sch. Dist., 989 F. Supp. 768 (D.S.C. 1997); Piwonka v. Tidehaven Indep.
Sch. Dist., 961 F. Supp. 169 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Marsh v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:94-
CV-2295-R, 1997 WL 118416 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 1997); Haley v. Va. Commonwealth
Univ., 948 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1996); Brooks v. Tulane Univ., No. CIV. A. 96-443, 1996
WL 709424 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 1996); Gonzalez v. Kahan, No. CV88-922, 1996 WL 705320
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1996); Doe v. Lance, No. 3:95-CV-736RM, 1996 WL 663159 (N.D. Ind.
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educational institution 40.0% of the time. After Gebser, however,
between 2006 and 2007, of twenty-nine cases involving claims of
sexual harassment under the color of Title IX, federal district
courts granted judgment in favor of the moving educational insti-
tution fifteen times, or 51.7% of the time.
22 4
Oct. 30, 1996); Wright v. Mason City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa
1996); Linson v. Trustees of Univ. of Pa., No. Civ. A. No. 95-3681, 1996 WL 479532 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 21, 1996); Pallet v. Palma, 914 F. Supp. 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated, Kracunas
v. Iona Coll., 119 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1997).
For the court decisions during the 1996-1997 time period denying the educational insti-
tutions' motions for summary judgment or dismissal on the pleadings, see Miles v. N.Y.
Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Doe v. Oyster River Coop. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp.
467 (D.N.H. 1997); Lawrence v. Cent. Conn. State Univ., No. 3:96-CV-1492, 1997 WL
527356 (D. Conn. Aug. 19, 1997); Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.H.
1997); Seneway v. Canon McMillan Sch. Dist., 969 F. Supp. 325 (W.D. Pa. 1997); Nicole M.
v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Collier v. William Penn
Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1997), rev'd, 191 F.3d 444 (3d Cir. 1999); Doe v.
Covington County Sch. Bd., 969 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Donovan v. Mount Ida
Coll., No. CIV. A. 96-CV-10289RGS, 1997 WL 259522 (D. Mass. Jan. 3, 1997); Stilly v.
Univ. of Pittsburgh Sys. of Higher Educ., 968 F. Supp. 252 (W.D. Pa. 1996); Bruneau v. S.
Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162 (N.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 163 F.3d 749 (2d Cir.
1998); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Nelson v. Al-
mont Cmty. Sch., 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Burrow v. Postville Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Bolon v. Rolla Pub. Sch., 917 F. Supp. 1423
(E.D. Mo. 1996).
224. For the court decisions during the 2006-2007 time period granting the educational
institutions' motions for summary judgment or dismissal on the pleadings, see Patterson
v. Hudson Area Sch., No. 05-74439, 2007 WL 4201137 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 28, 2007); Alegria
v. Texas, No. G-06-0212, 2007 WL 3256586 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2007); Hansen v. Bd. of Trs.
for Hamilton Se. Sch. Corp., No. 1:05-cv-670-IJM-WTL, 2007 VL 3091580 (S.D. Ind. Oct.
19, 2007); Herndon v. Coll. of the Mainland, No. G-06-286, 2007 WL 2142087 (S.D. Tex.
July 25, 2007); Johnson v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1:04-CV-6719 AWIDLB, 2007 WL
1456062 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2007); Ross v. Corp. of Mercer Univ., 506 F. Supp. 2d 1325
(M.D. Ga. 2007); Peer v. Porterfield, No. 1:05-cv-769, 2006 WL 389263 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 8,
2007); Hunter v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 456 F. Supp. 2d 255 (D. Mass. 2006); Doe v. Ohio
State Univ. Bd. of Regents, No. 2:04CV0307, 2006 WL 2813190 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2006);
Peck v. W. Aurora Sch. Dist., No. 06-C-1153, 2006 WL 2579678 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2006);
Mattingly v. Univ. of Louisville, No. 3:05CV-393-H, 2006 WL 2178032 (W.D. Ky. July 28,
2006); Bailey v. Orange County Sch. Bd., No. 6:04-cv-1751-Orl-22KRS, 2006 WL 2092267
(M.D. Fla. July 26, 2006), affd, 222 Fed. App'x. 932 (11th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Huddleston,
No. 03-1107, 2006 WL 1582455 (C.D. Ill. June 6, 2006); Cox v. Univ. of Ark., No.
4:05CV0001254-WRW, 2006 WL 1185380 (E.D. Ark. May 3, 2006), rev'd on other grounds,
Cox v. Sugg, 484 F.3d 1062 (8th Cir. 2007); Chivers v. Cent. Noble Cmty. Sch., 423 F.
Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Ind. 2006).
For the court decisions during the 2006-2007 time period denying the educational insti-
tutions' motions for summary judgment or dismissal on the pleadings, see Doe v. Autauga
County Bd. of Educ., No. 2:04-cv-1155-WKW (WO), 2007 WL 3287347 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 5,
2007); Aquilar v. Corral, No. CIV. S-07-1601 LKK/KJM, 2007 WL 2947557 (E.D. Cal. Oct.
9, 2007); Chancellor v. Pottsgrove Sch. Dist., 501 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Doe v.
Norwalk Cmty. Coll., No. 3:04-cv-1976 (JCH), 2007 WL 2066496 (D. Conn. July 16, 2007);
Britney B. v. Martinez, 494 F. Supp. 2d 534 (W.D. Tex. 2007); A.G. v. Autauga County Bd.
of Educ., 506 F. Supp. 2d 927 (M.D. Ala. 2007); Frechel-Rodriguez v. P.R. Dep't of Educ.,
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For commentators alleging that Gebser "severely limit[ed] the
options available to student-victims of sexual harassment, 225 the
data does not appear to support the null hypothesis that federal
district courts should grant more motions for summary judgment
and dismissal post-Gebser. While the percentage of motions
granted is about ten percent higher post-Gebser, that change is
small and possibly statistically insignificant when the number of
court cases surveyed is considered. 2 6 If the impact of Gebser had
followed many commentators' predictions, the number of lower
courts granting motions for summary judgment and dismissal
should have changed dramatically during the two time periods.
The results of the survey do not, however, support the projected
impact. This does not mean that the Gebser decision had no im-
pact on the chances of a student-victim of sexual harassment of
recovering from an educational institution receiving federal
funds.227 That type of conclusion cannot'be drawn from results of
No. 06-1095 (JAF), 2007 WL 1411760 (D.P.R. May 9, 2007); Bruning v. Carol Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 486 F. Supp. 2d 892 (N.D. Iowa 2007); Michelle M. v. Dunsmuir Joint Union Sch.
Dist., No. 2:04-cv-2411-MCE-PAN, 2006 WL 2927485 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2006); Doe v.
Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d 438 (D. Conn. 2006); Annamaria M. v. Napa Valley
Unified Sch. Dist., No. C 03-0101 VRW, 2006 WL 1525733 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2006); Doe
v. Erskine Coll., No. Civ. A. 8:04-23001RBH, 2006 WL 1473853 (D.S.C. May, 25, 2006);
Doe v. Alameda Unified Sch. Dist., No. C 04-02672 CRB, 2006 WL 734348 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
20, 2006); Zamora v. N. Salem Cent. Sch. Dist., 414 F. Supp. 2d 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
225. Kristen L. Safier, Comment, A Request for Congressional Action: Deconstructing
the Supreme Court's (In)Activism in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 118
S. Ct. 1989 (1998) and Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999),
68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1328 (2000).
226. Using a Binomial Proportions test, the likelihood that there is no statistical sig-
nificance between the proportion 10 125 and 15129, representing the number of motions
for dismissal or summary judgment for moving educational institution during the 1996-
1997 and 2006-2007 periods, respectively, is 38.9%. Using a Chi-square test for equality of
distributions, the likelihood that there is no statistical significance between the two pro-
portions rises to 55.4%. Thus, the difference between the two sets of data is small and pos-
sibly statistically insignificant.
227. There are numerous reasons why the survey does not conclusively indicate that
the Gebser decision has had no negative impact on the success of student-plaintiffs' Title
IX claims. First, the number of motions for dismissal and summary judgment that are
granted or denied may not accurately reflect the effect of the Gebser decision. The survey
does not indicate the reason for grant or denial. It is possible that, for example, more frivo-
lous cases have been brought in the latter time period than the former, thereby skewing
the results. Moreover, the survey is not necessarily representative of the "average" deci-
sion of lower courts. In other words, the two sample periods could be skewed toward courts
that are more or less likely to grant these types of motions than the "average" federal dis-
trict court in the United States, where the "average" court represents the median on a dis-
tribution of courts around a mean on a scale of likelihood to grant these motions. Also,
some courts were imposing a higher standard-discriminatory intent-such as the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. See Linson v. Trs. of Univ. of
Pa., No. CIV. A. 95-3681, 1996 WL 637810, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1996). Again, because
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the survey. Rather, the conclusion should be narrow-only that
the results do not support the conclusion that the standard of li-
ability developed under Gebser has significantly affected the
number of motions granted between the two time periods.
VI. THE NATURAL SHIFT TO BROADER INTERPRETATIONS OF
NOTICE-CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE IN SUBSTANCE AND THE
LIMITING OF GEBSER
Now, almost ten years after Gebser, the lower courts have had
time to digest the adoption of the actual notice and deliberate in-
difference standard. While the expectation that student-victims
would encounter significant difficulties in surviving the courts'
gatekeeping role has not occurred, a counter-trend may have
emerged. Some courts appear to be effectively drifting back to-
ward a standard based on constructive notice instead of actual
notice.228 Per the Court's direction, the term "constructive notice"
has not been specifically used after Gebser, but lower courts have
been finding actual notice under facts resembling prior cases
where constructive notice existed. Additionally, some courts have
limited Gebser by interpreting the Supreme Court's decision to
apply only to cases where the offending school employee's behav-
ior was not a foreseeable result of the school's policy. 2 9
One example of a possible and recent drift away from the Geb-
ser standard surfaced in Williams v. Board of Regents of the Uni-
versity System of Georgia.2' ° There, a female college student was
sexually assaulted by several student athletes from different
Georgia sports teams. 231 The Eleventh Circuit first stated that
"preexisting knowledge of [the offender]'s past sexual misconduct
... [is] relevant when determining whether [the plaintiff] alleged
facts sufficient to survive the defendants' motion to dismiss her
Title IX complaint." 23 2 Evidently, the student-athletes who com-
mitted the sexual assault had a history of sexual misconduct and
the survey does not indicate the reason underlying the grant of denial of the motions, cau-
tion should be taken in drawing conclusions.
228. See infra notes 230-47 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007).
230. 477 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007).
231. Id. at 1288.
232. Id. at 1293.
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the coaches that recruited them were aware of this behavior. 33
While high level school officials were made aware of the particu-
lar incident on the university campus,2 34 the court's willingness to
include this preexisting knowledge into its determination of Title
IX institutional liability cuts against the eschewal of constructive
notice and negligence standards in Gebser and Davis.235 Specifi-
cally, it directly conflicts with Gebser's instruction that a plaintiff
must show an appropriate person had "actual knowledge of dis-
crimination in the recipient's programs."236
One of the more highly publicized cases in the Title IX arena in
recent years, Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder illus-
trates the willingness of United States courts of appeal to limit
Gebser.237 In Simpson, several female University of Colorado stu-
dents were sexually assaulted by high-school football recruits who
were on a recruiting tour hosted by members of the football team
and a female student ambassador at the campus.238 The Tenth
Circuit noted the variety of sources of information indicating that
a sexual assault was possible, if not likely, to occur on these re-
cruiting visits if they were inadequately supervised.2 39 Because
the Title IX complaint was that the university sanctioned, and
even funded, a program "that, without proper control, would en-
courage young men to engage in opprobrious acts," the court held
that the notice standard of Gebser and Davis did not apply.24° It
based this distinction on the Court's remarks in Gebser: "The
Court said that the requirements it imposed applied to 'cases like
this one that do not involve official policy of the [school dis-
trict].'241 This tact by the Tenth Circuit diverts significantly from
the course chartered by Gebser because the actual policy of the
University of Colorado Boulder was not one of sexual harassment,
but one that created an environment in which sexual harassment
233. Id. at 1289-90.
234. Id.
235. But see Escue v. N. Okla. Coll., 450 F.3d 1146, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 2006) (reason-
ing that knowledge of past instances of misconduct "were too dissimilar, too infrequent,
and/or too distant in time' to provide the school with actual knowledge of sexual harass-
ment").
236. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998) (emphasis added).
237. See 500 F.3d 1170, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007).
238. Id. at 1173.
239. Id. at 1182-83.
240. Id. at 1177.
241. Id. (quoting Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290).
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was likely to occur.242 This standard sounds in negligence. One
could conclude that the Court in Simpson merely reasoned that
the university should have known of the sexual harassment be-
cause it was a foreseeable result of the recruiting program, but
that the court simply used different language to announce its
holding.
Doe v. Green, a case discussed earlier,243 validates that the
Tenth Circuit is not alone in distinguishing Gebser and drifting
back toward a standard based on constructive notice. Analyzing
the Title IX claim, the court in Green acknowledged that "'actual
notice' is required under Gebser."2 44 In a peculiar turn, however,
the court then held that 'the actual notice standard is met when
an appropriate official has actual knowledge of a substantial risk
of abuse to students based on prior complaints by other stu-
dents.' 2 45 The Court in Gebser indicated that "complaint[s] from
parents of other students charging only that [the teacher] had
made inappropriate comments during class... was plainly insuf-
ficient" to create actual knowledge.246 While it is unclear how
Gebser would have decided a case where there were complaints by
other students of separate conduct amounting to sexual harass-
ment, Green assumed it would have found actual notice in such a
case. 247
VII. CONCLUSION
The current consensus is that Title IX has more bark than bite,
especially after the Supreme Court raised the standard of institu-
tional liability in Gebser. Although this conclusion makes sense in
theory, there is a lack of empirical evidence showing that courts
are more inclined to rule in favor of educational institutions post-
Gebser. Perhaps this is because courts are aware of the sexual
harassment epidemic plaguing our nation's schools and universi-
ties. Even if commentators are wrong about Gebser's direct im-
pact on the viability of Title IX claims by student-victims, the
242. See id.
243. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
244. Doe v. Green, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1032 (D. Nev. 2004).
245. Id. at 1033 (quoting Johnson v. Galen Health Inst., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 679, 688
(W.D. Ky. 2003)) (emphasis added).
246. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291.
247. See Green, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 1033.
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continued prevalence of sexual harassment in our nation's schools
makes the debate over whether the Court's decision negatively
impacted Title IX claims wholly irrelevant. The debate should
center instead on how to root out sexual harassment.
Arguably the strongest point made by commentators criticizing
the Gebser standard is that educational institutions may attempt
to avoid learning of sexual harassment in their schools-and
therefore avoid Title IX liability. This may be a valid point, and
the cases of teachers who have been accused, convicted, or held
liable for sexual misconduct, yet continued to teach in other dis-
tricts, may support this view, although it is difficult to measure.
Moreover, student-victims of sexual harassment may be less
prone to report misconduct than adults because the student may
lack maturity, misunderstand the conduct, or fear stigmatization
by peers.248
A middle ground between this criticism and the drawback to
moving to a vicarious liability standard would permit liability for
negligence by reintroducing the concept of constructive notice. A
constructive notice standard would accomplish a similar objective
in the education context as in the employment context,249 but
without placing unreasonable demands on educational institu-
tions like the doctrine of respondeat superior. It would push edu-
cational institutions to improve monitoring and prevention sys-
tems and negate whatever tendency student-victims of sexual
harassment have in reporting the conduct.
One important question remains, however: How will change in
the legal standard be effected? One possible solution would be for
the media to turn its powerful spotlight to sexual harassment just
as it has to equality in sports. Still, the Supreme Court has yet to
contribute to the jurisprudence of Title IX's other half even in the
face of intense media exposure. Moreover, ten years is barely a
tick of the second hand on the Supreme Court's clock. It is
unlikely the Court would revisit such a recent decision as Gebser.
A second possible solution is for local governments to legislate in
the area, but a uniform solution would have a more significant
impact. After the courts and local governments, only one option
248. Stacy, supra note 14, at 1359.
249. See Note, Notice in Hostile Environment Discrimination Law, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1977, 1982-86 (1999) (explaining the constructive notice standard in the employment con-
text).
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remains. If the federal government is truly shouldering responsi-
bility for improving education, as evidenced by federal education
funding and blanket legislation such as No Child Left Behind,25 °
then the charge for curing this repugnant disease afflicting our
nation's schools rests with Congress. A recent study by the DOE
showed that 6.7% of children report being victims of physical,
sexual abuse in schools. 251 Title IX was passed over thirty-five
years ago when no such data existed. Perhaps it is time for a con-
gressional revisit.
Justin F. Paget
250. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (Supp. V 2005)).
251. See CHAROL SHAKEsHAFT, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., EDUCATOR SEXUAL MISCONDUCT:
A SYNTHESIS OF EXISTING LITERATURE 20 (2004).
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